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Financial Institutions in the International
Monetary System
by Jonathan David Aronson*
I. INTRODUCTION
T REATISES ON INTERNATIONAL monetary economics generally
stress the operation of market forces and belittle the importance of
market institutions. The activities of financial markets are examined; the
intervention of finance ministries and central banks is deplored; the influ-
ence of private financial actors is ignored. Economists usually assume
that the private pursuit of profits has little effect on monetary crises or
monetary reform.1 Therefore, economists regard recent changes in the
role of private financial actors as irrelevant and disregard financial in-
termediaries' expanding influence over the calculus of international mon-
etary politics.2 Policy efficiency suffers.
This essay examines the evolving role of commercial banks within the
world monetary system since 1970. It then explores possible effects of
transnational banks and insurance enterprises on the operations of the
monetary system. Finally, it speculates on the importance of current
changes in financial and industrial structure for the management of mon-
etary crises and monetary reform.
H. BANKS AS INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ACTORS
Most adults believe that bankers are rich and therefore are powerful.
They assume that wealth is translated easily into political influence.
Sometimes this assumption is correct, sometimes not. For example, in the
1920s the House of Morgan actively assisted in the restabilization of Eu-
ropean currencies and the National City Bank and the Chase National
Bank participated in and benefited from American dollar diplomacy.3
* B.A. (1971) Harvard University; M.A. (1975) Stanford University; Ph.D. (1977) Stan-
ford University. The author is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Rela-
tions at the University of Southern California.
1 Private actors are totally ignored in standard works on the monetary system. See, e.g.,
R. SOLOMON, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 1945-1976 (1977); C.F. BERGSTEN, THE
DILEMMAS OF THE DOLLAR (1975).
2 Id. There is a partial exception for works which deal with North-South relations and
focus on trade, aid, and investment.
3 The best studies of private bank power remain: H. FEIs, EUROPE THE WORLD'S
BANKER, 1870-1914 (1965) and R. DEROOVER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MEDICI BANK,
1397-1494 (1963). On bank influence during the 1920's see S. CLARKE, CENTRAL BANK COOP-
ERATION, 1924-1931 (1967).
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However, banks retreated from the political limelight in the 1930s, uncer-
tain of their goals, distrusted by politicians and society, and shackled
with new regulations designed to prevent the last depression.4
In this atmosphere, the political economy of Adam Smith and J.S.
Mill faded from view, replaced by the new Keynesian economics. J.M.
Keynes' interpreters believed that national economies and the world eco-
nomic regime could be successfully managed by governments and interna-
tional organizations. 5 Banks and corporations could be legislated into
place. Under the tutelage of Keynes, the Bretton Woods monetary system
was created by Britain and the United States for the United States and
Britain. Bankers were not invited to the meetings, were dubious about
the new system, and had no choice but to leave the management of the
monetary system to governments.' The system was designed to allow any
nation to adjust its exchange rate with other currencies in response to the
relative health and prosperity of its economy.7 In fact, political restraints
discouraged voluntary exchange rate adjustments. Instead, when pres-
sures developed, capital controls were promulgated.8 In the late 1950s,
just as the Bretton Woods system reached its zenith, structural inconsis-
tencies became evident.9 Patchwork controls were no longer effective, so
exchange rate adjustments became commonplace.
Meanwhile, American constraints on capital flows stimulated the
growth of the Eurodollar market, beyond the grasp of national monetary
authorities. Banks and corporations supported the fixed rate Bretton
Woods system which had nurtured their post-war growth.10 Exchange cri-
ses were predictable. Open positions could be hedged to protect against
losses. Significantly, before 1971 foreign exchange operations were service
centers not profit centers for major banks. Clearly, while currencies
moved only within narrow boundaries, large profits were generated only
' Of particular importance was the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 which widened
the authority of the Federal Reserve Board, prohibited banks from paying interest on de-
mands, separated commercial and investment banking, and created the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation. H.R. 5661 Publication No. 66 June 16, 1933.
" Keynes has often been misinterpreted. H. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975)
makes this clear. However, Keynes' followers, including those participating in the negotia-
tions at Bretton Woods obviously had some faith in his ideas. See R.F. HARROD, THE LIFE
OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1963).
6 J. ARONSON, MONEY AND POWER: BANKS AND THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM 38-39
(1978).
The classic work on the Bretton Woods system is R. GARDNER, STERLING DOLLAR Di-
PLOMACY (1956).
s A. LANYI, Political Aspects of Exchange Rate Systems, in COMMUNICATION IN INTER-
NATIONAL POLITIcS 423 (R. Merritt ed. 1967).
9 R. TRIFFIN, GOLD AND THE DOLLAR CRISIS 35-47 (1960).
10 Before final approval many U.S. bankers opposed the IMF and favored the World
Bank. J. ARONSON, supra note 6, at 38.
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during crises culminating in currency realignments. Although foreign ex-
change dealers might have earned larger profits by provoking crises, there
is no evidence that this occurred in the 1950s or 1960s. 1  It was senseless
to disrupt a successful monetary regime to take short-term profits.
While confidence in the fixed rate system remained high, banks often
took open positions to cover their customers' hedging needs, thereby
helping to stabilize exchange rates. Traders closed their positions when
circumstances permitted. Frequently, banks' speculative activities per-
mitted central banks to remain out of the markets. 2 As long as market
participants believed that the United States and Great Britain would de-
fend their currencies against devaluation, the exchange markets were
largely self-regulating.
From the late 1940's until August 1971 banks influenced the tim-
ing of crises, but rarely caused crises. When a nation's economy weak-
ened or strengthened, making its currency a candidate for adjustment,
banks advised their corporate clients. These corporate customers then in-
creased their leading and lagging of payments and began hedging previ-
ously uncovered transactions. These actions pressured the target currency
in the forward markets."3 The banks, acting as equilibrating speculators,
accepted long positions in weakening currencies (or short positions in
strengthening ones). Traders immediately offset their positions in the
spot markets, which forced central banks to supply them with funds.
American and British banks often were unfairly labeled as malicious
speculators because of these offsetting spot activities.1 4
While exchange rates floated between mid-August and mid-Decem-
ber 1971, banks learned that exchange rate volatility could be profitable.
5
n The British Labour government accused commercial banks of speculating against
sterling during the 1960s. Few bankers or central bankers accept this view. H. WILSON, A
PERSONAL RECORD: THE LABoUR GOVERNMENT, 1964-1970 at 37 (1971).
'2 Burtle, Equilibrating the Foreign Exchange Market, 9 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 61-67
(1974).
" E. CHALMERS, FORWARD EXCHANGE INTERVENTION: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1964-
1967 (1971).
14 After the 1967 sterling devaluation the Bank of England tried to punish "speculat-
ing" banks by threatening to cancel all spot contracts not settled on time. Since the ex-
change markets were closed, banks which were short in spot sterling but long in forward
sterling were caught. The New York banks, led by Morgan Guaranty, appealed to the New
York Federal Reserve Bank for assistance. After a rapid study of the situation, the New
York Fed loaned the commercial banks the sterling they needed. See, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting 10-
11 (Nov. 27, 1967).
18 Under fixed exchange rates it was extrefiely difficult to make any profits because
there was less volume and little volatility. More on foreign exchange profits and bank activi-
ties can be found in J. E. SPERO, THE FAiLuRE OF THE FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK 21-25
(1980).
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Banks rediscovered the virtues of free markets."6 As foreign exchange vol-
ume increased, so did bank profits. Volatility of rates made wider bid-
offer quotes acceptable and allowed traders to make profits without tak-
ing large, open, overnight positions. Many of the banks which entered
London for the first time in the 1970s planned to cover expenses until
they established their Eurodollar business by earning foreign exchange
profits. The demand for traders was so great that inexperienced dealers
rapidly gained substantial authority in the euphoria which accompanied
foreign exchange profits.
17
Most American, British, and Canadian banks made their foreign ex-
change profits on volume and differentials. However, some continental
European banks evidently took open positions, alone, or in cooperation
with other banks, to manipulate exchange rates during the trading day.' s
Such speculation when combined with the general volatility of exchange
rates created short-term discrepancies between the performances of econ-
omies and currencies. Often, traders believed the dollar was undervalued,
but were unwilling to act on that belief because they did not trust the
efficiency of the adjustment process. Large banks speculated (i.e. took
open positions) less than before, this allowed speculative actions by
smaller institutions to move exchange rates without regard for the eco-
nomic outlook. Volatility was caused by too little, rather than too much,
speculation. Indeed, central banks have been forced to intervene in ex-
change markets in greater magnitude in the 1970s than in the 1960s. 19
Traders became uncertain of the market's medium-term economic out-
look and began reacting to news flowing over the Reuters teletype.
Some American banks speculated to try to recoup losses in other
parts of their operations.20 They helped create volatility, hoping to earn
profits on the swings. Eventually, the initial mania ended when losses by
the Franklin National Bank, Herstatt, Lloyds' Lugano branch, and others
surfaced. Short-term speculation receded for a time and some order was
reintroduced into the markets. By the late 1970s, however, confidence in
the dollar and in the functioning of the foreign exchange markets fell
once again. 0
America's balance of payments remained in deficit while inflation in
1" The author's information is gleaned from personal experience and interviews. Al-
though economists of all stripes favored the adoption of floating rates well before 1971 only
Citibank among the major American banks advocated floating rates before August 1971.
"7 The author's information is based on personal experience and interviews.
18 J. ARONSON, supra note 6, at 110-123.
'9 See, e.g., Reports on current developments in financial market printed in FED. RES.
BANK N.Y. Q. REv. For a discussion of post-1971 intervention mechanisms see J. WILIAM-
SON, THE FAILURE OF WORLD MONETARY REFORM, 1971-1974 at 125-130 (1977).
20 Franklin National Bank was the most spectacular case. Foreign exchange dealings
offered the opportunity to make quick profits to cover losses elsewhere in a bank's book.
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the United States increased. Soaring energy costs, paid for on the inter-
national market almost entirely in dollars, required huge movements of
funds from country to country and currency to currency. By the end of
the 1970s the Eurocurrency market had grown to over a trillion dollars on
a gross basis and to $600 billion on a net basis. 1 Not surprisingly, some
central banks, flush with dollars, chose to diversify their reserves by ex-
changing some dollars for stronger currencies or for gold. Many corpora-
tions and individuals also sold dollars.2 Pressure on the dollar was pre-
dictable. However, Richard Cooper, the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, while arguing that the exchange rate experience of the
mid and late 1970s generally conformed to economic realities, recently
admitted that
there were clearly several occasions, briefly in the fall of 1977 and more
notably in October 1978, when exchange rates moved too far too rapidly.
It is difficult to explain the developments in October 1978 in terms of the
underlying economic developments.23
The dollar's volatility in October 1978, however, was not simply a
result of bank speculation. The continuing American payments deficit
and growing worries about inflation made surplus nations like Germany
and Switzerland appear attractive resting places for funds. American
leadership and will to triumph are in doubt. Without a restoration of con-
fidence in America's vision, leadership, and determination to control its
economy and maintain the monetary system, it is not irrational to sell
dollars and buy gold or stronger currencies. Since private firms and indi-
viduals now control far more dollars than central banks, they can over-
whelm the system if they panic. The dynamics of flexible exchange mar-
kets allow uneven lurches of exchange rates instead of smooth
trajectories. The short-term, prudent pursuit of profits by banks and cor-
porations could lead to a falling dollar and the collapse of monetary or-
der, even though none of the participants favors this result.
The growing influence of the banks can be viewed in another way, by
looking at the changing nature of foreign exchange crises in the past dec-
ade. Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, foreign
exchange crises were spectacles of confrontation between central banks
and the market. Central banks defended well demarcated currency perim-
eters against all incursions. Bank and corporate transactions put pressure
on exchange rates when the market believed currencies to be under or
over valued. Leads and lags of payments, not open currency positions,
2 WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, Dec. 1979, at 15.
22 Central banks from Singapore to Nigeria have diversified their reserves. Some Arab
OPEC nations spent their dollar receipts for imports while holding their non-dollar receipts.
Individuals also started investing beyond American borders.
22 Address by Richard Cooper, World Affairs Council of Philadelphia (Oct. 31, 1979).
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provided the main pressure during exchange rate crises.24
Crisis outcomes were a function of the relative willpower and of
funds available to adversaries. Until 1965 the central banks were stronger
on both counts. Governments refused to adjust their exchange rates be-
cause they feared reprisals at the polls. Government will was strong and
their word was generally accepted. The United States, the key country,
pledged to maintain the dollar's convertibility into gold at $35 per ounce,
its value since 1934. Such steadfastness inspired confidence and stability.
Corporations frequently left their foreign positions unhedged, believing
exchange values would be essentially fixed when their bills were settled.
Foreign exchange volume was extremely light by today's standards. In
such an atmosphere, blessed with superior funds, central banks won most
of their battles to maintain exchange rates.
However, by the mid-1960s banks and corporations grew more cer-
tain that the pound and dollar were overvalued and the mark and yen
were undervalued. They became convinced that exchange rates were be-
ing defended for political, not economic reasons and began seeing them-
selves as the "conscience" of the system. Moreover, the Eurodollar mar-
ket, inflated by U.S. exchange restraints and by its own convenience,
swelled the liquidity available to private actors. In 1964 the central banks
assembled a $3 billion swap package to salvage sterling when newly
elected Prime Minister Harold Wilson was unwilling to devalue.2 5 The
balance of economic power was shifting. The British conceded defeat, re-
nounced their promise to defend sterling, and allowed its devaluation in
November 1967.
Sterling was the dollar's shield. Since it was weaker than the dollar,
the market attacked it first. Then the dollar became vulnerable. After a
preliminary skirmish in May 1971, exchange market participants knew
they could defeat the dollar. Nonetheless, few private executives under-
stood the implication of the dollar's devaluation before the fact. They
sought an adjustment in its exchange value, not the destruction of the
Bretton Woods system. Instead, they initiated steps which led inevitably
to an increase in their political influence during exchange crises.
After the Smithsonian accords, fixed rates with wider margins were
restored. The most important change was perceptual. Once the dollar was
shown to be vulnerable, market confidence in American willingness to
prevent a recurrence vanished. Backwash crises developed in which capi-
tal markets transmitted massive short-term flows from currency to cur-
rency. Before August 1971 traders used the dollar as a resting area to
await crises in other currencies. Since then, bank traders and corporate
treasurers have not trusted the dollar or the U.S. authorities. They
24 P. EINzIG, LEADS AND LAGS: THE MAIN CAUSE OF DEVALUATION 136-141 (1968).
25 C. COOMBS, THE ARENA OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 121 (1976).
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treated the dollar just like any other currency even though its centrality
to the monetary system remained. The velocity and volume of foreign ex-
change transactions have grown almost without pause since the dollar was
revealed as being vulnerable.
Backwash crises did not always need deep underlying roots: spurious
rumors could ignite them. The June 1972 sterling float followed Britain's
repayment of its outstanding IMF debt for the first time since 1964 while
Britain was running a small, if diminishing, balance of payments surplus.
Then Treasury Under Secretary Paul Volcker praised the strength of
sterling, concluding the day before the float that surplus countries were in
no position to devalue.26
The second dollar devaluation was almost entirely different from the
first.2 7 Almost everyone inside the U.S. government believed that the first
devaluation had been too small, another devaluation would surely restore
the U.S. competitive balance. Actually, in mid-January 1973, only three
weeks before the devaluation, the dollar was stronger than at any time
since the Smithsonian accords. Italian and Swiss moves sucked the dollar
into the whirlpool. Currency flight set off by these nations forced the
United States to devalue on February 12, 1973. Modified fixed exchange
rates were once more instated in the wake of the devaluation. Three
weeks later, the market spoke. Although government and private observ-
ers agreed that the second dollar devaluation was large enough, rumors
that the European nations were considering a joint float of their curren-
cies fueled another speculative run from dollars to marks on March 1,
1973.28 The Bundesbank was smothered by an additional $3 billion in less
than an hour before closing its doors.2 9 The European markets closed.
They reopened on March 19, 1973, to a new floating exchange rate system
and to a new type of crisis.
In effect, governments and central banks acknowledged that they no
longer could control the mqrkets. In 1972 and early 1973 neither banks
nor central banks steered the markets. After March 1973, the govern-
ments decided to let the banks and other private actors run the game. A
new type of crisis emerged, where instead of massive movements of
reserves, there were huge swings in exchange rates. Unacceptable volatil-
ity forced central banks to resume limited intervention to smooth rates
three months after their departure from the markets. A certain amount of
bank speculation almost certainly distorted the adjustment process.
26 Proposed Amendments to the Par Value Modification Act: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking and Urban Affairs (1973) (testimony of P. Volcker).
27 J. Odell, The U.S. and the Emergence of Flexible Exchange Rates: An Analysis of
Foreign Policy Change, 33 INT'L ORGANIZATION 57-82 (1979).
28 J. ARONSON, supra note 6, at 104-05.
29 Id. at 106.
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Most observers intone that without flexible exchange rates the mone-
tary system would have collapsed completely under the onslaught of pe-
trodollars after 1973. Perhaps this is so, but the mechanism for achieving
regime change destroyed confidence and stability. It is at least as plausi-
ble to argue that the markets could not have equilibrated as well as they
have without the continual intervention of central bankers "leaning into
the wind." In fact, under the supposedly flexible exchange rate system,
there has been more central bank intervention to manage exchange pari-
ties than there ever was before August 1971. The authorities' control is
more tenuous and their strategies more secretive today, but their market
patrolling has discouraged the more rampant market speculation.
Problems for the dollar, given the tremendous amount of global dol-
lar liquidity, would continue with or without speculators. Crises today are
characterized by extreme exchange rate volatility coupled with huge mar-
ket intervention by central banks. The banks, along with transnational
enterprises, have the ability to threaten currency parities and even the
survival of the monetary system while pursuing short-term rational strat-
egies. Their power in the system has grown and their centrality to it has
become quite evident. To reestablish their dominance the United States
has tried to strengthen its own economic position. The issuance of non-
dollar denominated Treasury bills announced by President Carter on
November 1, 1978, helped for a time. The strong actions taken by Federal
Reserve Chairman Volcker on October 6, 1979, indicated a renewed deter-
mination by the Federal Reserve to support the dollar.3 The U.S. also
began to attack its trade balance in 1979. Despite large increases in the
price of oil in 1979, the U.S. balance of trade deficit declined somewhat.
However, confidence in the dollar and the monetary system have been
further undermined by the Iranian crisis. In panic, investors have moved
into precious metals and short-term securities. Movements in gold and in
the dollar are far more related to the political than to the economic suc-
cess of the United States at this time.
In summary, the monetary system is suffering a structural crisis. Pri-
vate institutions, governments, and individuals seeking to defend their
positions are unhappy holding too many dollars. They do not trust cen-
tral banks or finance ministries of the major developed nations. And, they
hold sufficient dollars to undercut its exchange value at will. Crises today
combine the attacks on government reserves characteristic of the pre-
1971 period with the tremendous volatility of the mid-1970s. Market con-
fidence is low; panic is not out of the question. Most observers agree that
we need to rationalize if not to reform completely the monetary system,
but nobody has indicated how to make the transition without suffering
30 H. Minsky, Financial Interrelations, the Balance of Payments, and the Dollar Cri-
sis, in DEBT AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 103 (J. Aronson ed. 1979).
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severe crisis or collapse first.3 ' Indeed, bankers are concerned about the
security of their own financial markets and were not forlorn when the
Iranian financial crisis reinjected some restraint into international lending
even in the face of continued excess supplies of available dollars to loan.
It is therefore important to assess the changing scope, but also the evolv-
ing limits of private actors' influence in the monetary system.
III. BANK AND INSURANCE INFLUENCE IN THE MONETARY SYSTEM
Most academic studies of the influence of multinational enterprises
have focused on the interactions between manufacturing and extractive
enterprises and home and host country governments. It is logically de-
scended from Raymond Vernon's path-breaking research on 187 U.S.-
based, Fortune 500, industrial companies. 32 Comparative work on Euro-
pean, Japanese, and developing country-based enterprises has begun to
appear and reinforces the emphasis on corporate-government relations.
Political science and policy studies on service industries have been sparse,
although a growing literature on financial institutions, particularly in re-
lation to developing countries, is emerging. Again, however, these banking
studies have focused on bank-government interactions. The political im-
portance of insurance, construction, advertising, or the legal and account-
ing professions has been almost totally ignored. This is so even though
they are actively involved in international business.
What has not been widely realized is that service industries such as
banks or insurance enterprises require a different framework of analysis
than extractive or manufacturing industries. Service industries are the
catalysts of the system which maintain the linkages between nations and
between transnational enterprises, thus holding the international eco-
nomic system together. If banks and insurance enterprises ceased operat-
ing, the trade and monetary systems would cease to function. This is so
obvious that it is almost never considered. When examining the function-
ing of the monetary system, it is necessary to analyze the interaction of
service industries with the system and within the system as well as with
governments participating in the system. Banks and insurance enterprises
are the links which hold the system together and allow it to function. As
their roles change, so does the system and its stability. Unless this rela-
tionship is understood by those in the public and private sectors, regula-
tions aimed at the service sector are more likely to distort the system
then to manage it.
31 R. KEOHANE & J. NYE. POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLrTCS IN TRANSITION
(1977), examines the need for regime change in the monetary system. It does not tackle the
more difficult problem of finding adaptive strategies to accomplish these transformations.
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A. Banks Within the Monetary System.
Banks are the intermediaries which allow for the transfer of funds
from one nation to another and the exchange of one currency for another.
Reacting to market forces and to their own profit seeking, they should
help stabilize the monetary system. Thus banks performed with great
success the complex task of recycling the petrodollar glut in the mid-
1970s. Although the magnitude of funds flowing between nations shifted
radically almost overnight, banks redistributed the funds among them-
selves and recycled them to nations which were suddenly caught short.
Banks increased their balance of payments lending to stricken industrial
nations and boosted their credits to wealthier non-oil exporting develop-
ing nations. Official bilateral and multilateral aid therefore could be used
to assist the least developed nations. It seems evident that by redirecting
the financial intermediation between surplus and deficit countries in the
mid-1970s, Western commercial banks minimized the deflationary effect
of the OPEC surplus and thereby made an important contribution to
monetary stability. In addition, the banking system has contributed to
market stability by helping stretch out the maturity structures of OPEC
depositors, thereby calming fears of immediate flight of the deposits with-
out warning.3 3
However, the transformation of the international banking market has
also slowly changed the role of the banks in the monetary system. Before
World War I, banks and their home nations functioned together, seeking
common goals. Only in Japan does this pattern still hold. Today in-
creased international interdependence means that the largest banks, from
whatever country, frequently have more in common with each other than
with smaller banks from their own countries. In the early and mid-1960s
the largest banks shared the international market among themselves.
Competition was not too great so the good business could be spread
around. Profit growth was much higher outside of their domestic markets
than within. Prodded by U.S. exchange constraints in the mid-1960s,
smaller regional banks moved abroad. Japanese and German banks fol-
lowed later. By the early 1970s competition for international banking bus-
iness was intense.
The United States government was probably more responsible for
the changing role of banks in the markets and the monetary system than
any other government. America's attempt to reverse its balance of pay-
ments position through the imposition of the Interest Equalization Tax
32 R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY (1971) was the first major landmark in the reexami-
nation of the role of multinational enterprise.
33 M. FUJIoKA, A. LAMFALUsSY, & B. MACLAURY, TRILATERAL COMMISSION DRAFT REPORT,
MAJOR PAYMENTS IMBALANCES AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY, (March 1979).
Vol. 12:341
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(1963), the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program (1965), and the
Foreign Direct Investment Program (1968) may or may not have delayed
the first devaluation."' It certainly accelerated the growth and attractive-
ness of the Eurodollar market and virtually forced many smaller banks to
move abroad more rapidly, more vigorously, and in greater numbers than
otherwise would have been prudent. Smaller non-American banks and
some previously insular large foreign banks were prompted to become
more international or risk declining market visibility and profits.
Each bank entering the international market needed to establish an
immediate profit base. Since most of the best traditional borrowers were
already committed to large banks, newcomers had to hustle business or
admit defeat and return home. Since the public relations costs of retreat
were high, newcomers stole business from established institutions. 5 In
the foreign exchange markets they pushed the bid-offer differentials
closer together and took open positions during the business day. In the
Eurocurrency markets, newcomers accepted slightly lower fees, pushed
margins down, tenors out, and gave borrowers the chance to take more
funds. The most credit-worthy customers discovered that they could bor-
row money on such favorable terms that banks made acceptable profits
only through undertaking huge volumes of business on minimal capital.
The large banks' oligopoly was broken and competition increased. There
was surplus liquidity in the markets, a need to lend these funds, and in-
evitably a decline in the quality of borrowers. The largest banks started
lending to developing countries, socialist nations, smaller multinationals,
and more recently to the People's Republic of China. Although the risks
were higher, so were the profits, and the competition was less. Gradually,
however, small banks ventured into these markets as well.
A borrower's market emerged. Banks which once sought borrowers
able to repay the interest and a portion of the principal of their loans out
of their expected cash flow, began accepting debtors unable even to pay
the interest on their loans from projected cash flows.38 Intense competi-
tion among lenders during 1973 and 1974 further eroded bank lending
standards. This deterioration was briefly constrained by the banking cri-
sis of 1974, but banks were so liquid after the OPEC price rises that
lending necessarily resumed. Problems intensified when traditional bor-
rowers' loan demand stagnated. Prime borrowers switched to the bond
markets and the commercial paper market from the Euromarkets. By
3J J. ARONSON, supra note 6, at 69-91; J. Conybeare, United States Foreign Economic
Policy and the International Capital Markets: The Case of Capital Export controls, 1963-
1974 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1976).
31 A common joke in London in the 1970s was that many small banks wished they
could be the second bank to leave. Although a few banks have now departed, 387 non-
British banks were represented in London in November 1979.
38 H. MINSKY, THE FINANcIAL INSTABILITY HypoTmsis: A RESTATYmENT (Jan. 1979).
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1979 over forty-three percent of Eurocurrency syndication funds went to
non-OPEC developing nations.37
Banks assured their stockholders and themselves that these new
loans presented no major problems.3 s They pointed out that there had
been no major LDC (less developed country) defaults since World War H
and that the growth of Eurocurrency loans to these nations, when ad-
justed for inflation, was not out of line.$' They neglected pre-World War
II experiences which indicated that "productive loans to developing coun-
tries are not very productive and do not stay long out of default."'40 In
part this was because banks did not have to worry about the repayment
of Eurosyndicates until the late 1970s. The eight and ten year loans made
in the early 1970s took their profits up front, but the principal was not
due until the end of the decade. So far, loans have been rolled over or
rescheduled, but rarely repaid.
In theory, the banking system should funnel funds to projects and
countries where long-term economic returns will be maximized. In prac-
tice, the banking system has not realized sufficient rent for the use of its
funds as the risks justify. There are two reasons for this miscalculation.
First, the "over-competition" of swelling numbers of banks competing for
a slower growing amount of desirable business distorted risk-return anal-
yses. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to correct the situation. Large
banks are so committed to some developing countries that they cannot
withdraw. If smaller banks decide to pull out of a shaky country, the
large institutions must assume their positions as well or risk country de-
faults. In addition, banks are not terribly worried about even major losses
since most institutions involved internationally are large enough that
their national governments would probably bail them out rather than risk
disrupting their domestic economies. 4 2
A second reason for bank miscalculations was their complacence to-
wards political risks. Bankers averred that although manufacturing and
extractive firms were vulnerable to nationalization, no rational national
leader would destroy his nation's credit-worthiness by defaulting on in-
ternational bank loans. While the banks accepted intermittent loan roll
overs, as long as interest continued to be paid, this actually benefited
them by making it unnecessary to find new borrowers.42 In the late 1970s
" WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS, Jan. 1980 at 16.
38 See I. FRIEDMAN, THE EMERGING ROLE OF PRIVATE BANKS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
(1977) and Cleveland & Brittain, Are the LDCs in Over Their Heads?, 55 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
732 (1977).
39 I. FRIEDMAN and Cleveland & Brittain, supra note 38.
0 C. Kindleberger, Debt Situation of the Developing Countries in Historical Perspec-
tive (Apr. 1977) (paper for a symposium of the Export-Import Bank).
41 Bail out can be expensive. Pumping $1.5 billion into the ailing Franklin National
Bank increased U.S. inflation measurably.
4 W.A. LEWIs, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 65 (1978).
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banks even accepted the political risks of oil companies operating in In-
donesia and Malaysia because they felt secure from national upheavals.43
In essence, the banks believed that their bargaining position was not an
obsolescing one. They were in a stable mutual hostage position with their
borrowers.
In late 1979 the banks were forced to reanalyze their position by the
events in Iran. Following the seizure of hostages, the Foreign Ministry
announced on November 14, 1979, that Iran intended to withdraw its for-
eign currency reserves from U.S. banks. The same day President Carter
blocked all Iranian property and interests held in the United States or by
U.S.-controlled institutions abroad. Within two days Citibank, Chase
Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, and Bankers Trust offset their Ira-
nian loans with their Iranian deposits. Some banks which did not have
sufficient deposits to cover their loans were stuck. On November 19, 1979,
a Chase Manhattan-led, eleven bank, $500 million loan syndicate was de-
clared to be in default, despite efforts by the Iranian central bank to pay
monies due and over the objection of the four non-American participants.
The great Iranian asset grab began.
Although lawyers will profit from these moves for years, the banks
have already learned several lessons from Iran. First, political risks are
greater than the banks believed. Suddenly, a plethora of bank studies on
such countries as Brazil, the Philippines, and South Korea are emerging.
The banks were lucky with Iran. Other countries do not hold deposits
with American banks. Thus banks are concerned about Brazil's external
debt in excess of $52 billion. Increased interest rates in 1978-79 cost the
Brazilians billions in extra servicing payments. The banks had assumed
the Brazilians would pay when required. They were so sure that many of
them committed large percentages of their total capital to loans in Brazil.
Yet Brazil will need over $18 billion in external funds just to stay even in
1980.44 Some official rescheduling may be necessary for the first time
since 1964. The banks are in a bind. If the banks and the Brazilian gov-
ernment press the Brazilian people too hard for funds for repayment, so-
cial unrest and ultimately even revolution could occur. (The same is true
of the Philippines where a great deal of the loan calculations are based on
the continued rule of President Marcos or someone in his image.) Yet,
widespread rescheduling by Brazil on relatively soft terms might convince
many other nations that they could opt for partial default and survive in
the banking system. Whether the banking and monetary system could
continue to prosper is more problematic. However, the banks are fortu-
nate that the first instance of default came in a country where they could
43 Mobil Oil in Indonesia and Esso in Malaysia negotiated loans with international
bank syndicates which forced the banks to collect from the country, not the oil company, if
oil operations were nationalized unfairly.
" EuRoMoNEY, Jan. 1980, at 64.
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protect themselves from serious harm. They may now safeguard their po-
sitions in more vulnerable, dangerous nations.
A second lesson from Iran for the banks is that the Eurocurrency
markets are not completely outside the grasp of national governments.
The United States government froze funds held in London and Europe."5
For the first time since the collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt in mid-
1974, significant interbank conflict exists in the banking system. Ameri-
cans were the leading Eurobankers of the 1970s. It is already clear that
Eurosyndications have slowed in early 1980. Tenors are coming down and
it is unlikely that margins will not rise. It is also not clear that U.S.
money center banks will automatically reestablish their market leader-
ship when the crisis abates. However, from a global perspective, this may
be a positive development. If lending has increased too rapidly, this mini-
crisis may pull it back to earth before a major crash occurs and allow
bankers to reassert order in the markets. Although bilateral and multilat-
eral aid will need to increase to meet the problems generated by the 1979
petroleum price rises, the banks may end up playing a more selective,
prudent role in the next round of the monetary drama. They are less
likely in the early 1980s to precipitate a crisis leading to monetary
collapse.
A final point underlined by the Iranian crisis is a side issue, not em-
phasized by the media. Iran has threatened not to accept dollars in pay-
ment for its oil in the future. Oil payments in non-dollar currencies in-
stead of subsequent diversification of dollar-denominated oil bills may
help diminish the growth of dollar liquidity in the monetary system. As
long as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Emirates do not follow suit, some
payments for oil in currencies other than dollars will force less dollar bor-
rowing and contribute to dollar and monetary stability. It is possible that
slowing of dollar growth in the Euromarkets could make it more likely
that nations will successfully negotiate a substitution account to soak up
wayward dollars.
In summary, the banking system's inertia towards over-competition
was disrupting sane economic and monetary developments until the ad-
vent of the Iranian crisis. As in government bureaucracies, the banks have
had trouble keeping sight of their economic goals, consequently the pro-
cess took over. Previously, bankruptcy forced the losers out of the system.
However, this adjustment mechanism is now too expensive to the nations
involved and for the stability of the monetary system. The largest banks
"5 The Euromarkets got their initial boost when the Soviet Union, fearing that the U.S.
might block their deposits in America, put their dollars in London and Paris bank accounts
instead. The only precedent for offshore freezing of bank deposits is United States v. First
National City Bank, a 1965 case in which the Supreme Court froze deposits of a Citibank
client in Uruguay. In that case, no foreign laws were violated.
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in each nation are sacrosanct. Their demise would upset national and in-
ternational economic systems. Although the system is largely out of con-
trol and self-correction is extremely difficult, the potential for disaster re-
mains largely unrecognized. We are not asking the right questions. It is
necessary to begin to understand the role of banks in the evolution of
monetary regimes. In a financially interdependent world it is too expen-
sive to pass hegemonic leadership from one leader to another only after
system collapse. System self-adjustment, which requires knowledge of the
role of service sector corporations, is necessary. Further research on these
factors is needed.
B. Insurance Within the Monetary System.
Insurance and insurance enterprises have been almost entirely ig-
nored within the broad context of global economic and monetary affairs.
The implications of cross national investment of insurance premiums, the
impact of insurance on balance of payments accounts, and the linkages
between insurance and inflation have been almost completely neglected.
There is, however, a growing literature on the role of insurance in the
process of development and a series of pieces extolling the positive bene-
fits of free trade in insurance. 46 In addition, there is a proliferating body
of materials on public and private political risk insurance schemes. 47 Two
major stumbling blocks prevented serious consideration of the macro-eco-
nomic and political effects of insurance. First, insurance regulation, par-
ticularly in the United States, is decentralized. Each state has its own
rules and usable aggregate statistics are rare. Outside the United States,
regulatory differences abound and again statistics are difficult to assem-
ble. Second, the insurance market is more complex than the commercial
banking system. The market consists of life insurance and general insur-
ance companies. Insurance brokers are active and important. The reinsur-
ance companies are crucial. Lloyd's of London, an insurance market not a
company, has its own role. A New York insurance market is being organ-
ized. Captive insurance companies, owned by industrial concerns, began
as self-insurers, but now accept outside business. Mutual insurance agree-
ments such as the Protecting and Indemnity Clubs in marine lines also
abound. And, of course, insurance is divided by lines (e.g. marines, fire,
life, aviation) each of which plays its own special role.
46 See G. JUNNE, THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES, U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL COPORATIONS, (March 1977), and numer-
ous reports prepared by the Committee on Invisibles of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development. See also L. Buol, UNCTAD's Special Program in Insurance,
BEST'S REVIEw, Nov. 1975, at 56-59. The leading advocate of free trade in insurance has
been the American International Group.
47 See J. Radcliffe & C. Berry, Political Risk Analysis for Overseas Contracts, Risic
MANAGEMENT Dec. 1975.
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Yet there remain important reasons to begin the research effort. In-
surance is a vast, and increasingly international industry. Global 1977
premiums were estimated at just under $300 billion, almost half originat-
ing in the United States. The most active insurance purchasers are in the
United States and the United Kingdom where, in 1977, premiums as a
percentage of gross national product were 7.67 percent and 5.67 percent
respectively. Moreover, insurance premiums are expanding faster than
the gross national product worldwide. The ratio of insurance premiums to
world GNP (excluding the Eastern Bloc) increased from 4.75 percent in
1967, to 5.15 percent in 1972, and to 5.34 percent in 1977.48 Moreover,
domestic insurers, worried by the saturation of their home markets and
the growing competition for solid, domestic business, have moved abroad
to find new profit opportunities and to spread their risks. The flows of
these insurance and reinsurance premiums and payments across national
boundaries and the investment decisions of transnational insurance en-
terprises may have important consequences for international monetary
operations. One recent article, for instance, estimates that in 1977 the
U.S. experienced a $3 billion insurance deficit and that between 1958 and
1977 the U.S. deficit on freight and insurance (on merchandise plus non-
merchandise insurance free on board) totaled almost $14 billion.49 At pre-
sent, however, nobody knows for sure: the data is lacking. However, it is
possible to speculate on potential effects of insurance operations on mon-
etary stability.
In theory, insurers accept risk and instability from those they insure,
allowing the insured to plan their cash flows more efficiently. Ironically,
insurers are unable to manage their own stability of income and returns.
Insurance companies therefore expect that each line of the business will
show returns which over time roughly approximate a sine wave, the so-
called underwriting cycle. If the insurance market works efficiently, when
profits are too high new underwriters will enter the market, forcing down
the rates. When profits inevitably dip, speculators will flee the market in
search of higher returns on their funds. In the process, insurers will
"rate" risks, differentiating between those they insure on the basis of
safety of operation, efficiency of management, and past record. The better
the record the lower the premium rate and vice versa.
In practice, the stability of underwriting cycles is now widely ques-
tioned. Underwriters are writing business for premium income. Their
profits come from investment of the premiums not from underwriting
48 SIGMA (a publication of Swiss Reinsurance Co.), May 1979, at 6, 10.
F. Gahin, International Insurance Transactions in the U.S. Balance of Payments,
BEST'S REVIEW, October 1977, at 14-15. See also Dickinson, International Insurance Trans-




profits (i.e. the difference between premiums paid in and claims paid
out). There has been so much new additional underwriting capacity in
most insurance lines that underwriting profits have largely vanished and
investment profits predominate. Indeed, many insurance enterprises show
consistent underwriting losses.50
While investment returns remain high, and the world economy ex-
pands, the insurers are satisfied. There has been no slowdown in the rush
of new faces to the insurance markets, even if the effective rating of most
risks is now impossible. Some insurers wish for another Hurricane Betsy
to restore order. And, they insist, only a major catastrophe will help: avia-
tion disasters and major oil spills hardly budge the rates or slow the
growth in insurance capacity.51
Some critics argue that insurers, in their greed for premium income,
have insured "uninsurable" projects. It is also not clear that the conven-
tional assumption that "the greater the catastrophe the less likely its oc-
currence" is valid.52 Difficulties are obvious in the rash of misjudgments,
frauds, and disasters that have recently shaken Lloyd's of London.58
Should greater losses occur, the capital of many insurance enterprises
could be severely tested. Without insurance coverage the continued ex-
pansion and interdependence of the world economy would be threatened.
Since insurance is now so international, the consequences of collapse
would also be international in scope. Yet if national governments try to
control insurance flows overtly, without understanding the system they
are trying to regulate, they risk crimping their own economic growth.
C. Banking, Insurance and Possible Monetary Instability.
In conclusion, banks and insurance enterprises are so central to the
operations of the economic system that serious problems within the
financial system could threaten the continuing adjustment of the mone-
tary and trade systems. Moreover, both banking and insurance have be-
come more international and more fragile in the past fifteen years. Banks'
international lending increased faster than the growth of sound borrowers
in the system. Insurance capacity rose faster than insurable risks. The
quality of business for both industries has declined. Although there are
now some signs of a slow reversal, the borrowers and the insured have
11 B. DOODY, A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 1950-1977 (1979).
51 The author's information is gleaned from personal experience and interviews.
52 H. Henderson, Risk, Uncertainty and Economic Futures, 9 GENEvA PAPERS ON RISK
AND INSURANCE 11 (July 1978).
" Lloyd's of London was racked with major losses and scandals in the late 1970s. Huge
losses were suffered when Lloyd's unwisely ventured into insurance for computer leasing.
The Frederick Sasse syndicate was bankrupted by giant losses, particularly in the American
fire market. Fraud may be involved in the Savonita Affair losses in which Fiats were "de-
stroyed" during a fire but were then resold at a substantial portion of their original price
after full insurance compensation was made. A new scandal surrounding the scuttling of
ships is brewing. See FAR EASTERN ECONOMIc REvEmw, Nov. 16, 1979, at 66.
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been able to extract extremely favorable terms from the banks and insur-
ers. A borrower's market prevailed in banking with spreads dropping
sharply throughout the late 1970s. Insurers slashed premiums, fully aware
that price cutting would erode underwriting profits. Insurance brokers
used the existence of surplus insurance capacity to hold rates stable for
risk-prone customers and to win reductions for better risks. The fre-
quency, amplitude, and predictability of insurance underwriting cycles
across most lines broke down.
Eventually, unrealistic pricing in banking and insurance will vanish,
but the transition could prove costly to a variety of economies and to the
economic system as a whole. Developing country reschedulings of their
bank debt are now an accepted part of international finance. If banks fail
to roll over debts from major countries or if the countries refuse to meet
their obligations, the banking and eventually the monetary system could
be shaken. Similarly, earthquakes in California or Japan, a series of big
storms, or even the destruction of a multi-billion dollar liquefied natural
gas facility could topple major insurance actors, disrupt the insurance
system, and paralyze the transfer of goods and services among nations.
Unless the banking and insurance systems, these crucial service indus-
tries, function with relative smoothness and efficiency, the economic
fabric of global interdependence could begin to fray. Unfortunately, there
does not seem any great hope that the systems will demonstrate renewed
self-correction or that governments will enact regulations to effectively
direct banks and insurers to pursue system constructive paths. Unless
there is some movement towards strategic goal setting and greater con-
centration of the process of getting to those goals, tragedy and collapse
are not impossible.
IV. THE NE w SERVICE CONGLOMERATES AND MONETARY STABILITY
Potentially destabilizing competition is not, however, limited to the
banking and insurance markets. Manufacturing and extractive industries
are evolving into more service oriented institutions. They are earning in-
creasing percentages of their revenues from fee income and other service
activities. They are diversifying into and acquiring service oriented profit
centers. Their product lines are far less distinct than they were a decade
ago. Industrial enterprises are already competing in many areas with
traditional service companies. Very shortly governments may find their
regulation of these companies and of the economic and monetary systems
still more difficult. Apparently, the impact of industrial firms on the
structure and functioning of monetary, trade, and investment relations
among nations will continue increasing. Growing global service industry
interdependence will make regulation of the economic regimes even more
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complex. Government regulations aimed at controlling corporations in-
stead of at directing the evolution of the economic system will prove fu-
tile and ultimately destabilizing. Some form of international regulation
will be required to prevent the unstable forces of "over-competition"
within the market from wreaking havoc with economic order."
Two key factors have provoked the evolution towards service con-
glomerates. The change from fixed to flexible exchange rates exposed
large international corporations to substantial, unpredictable exchange
and translation risks previously absent. Corporate executives were forced
to worry about the danger of "yo-yo" profits influenced by exchange cri-
ses which could disrupt the smooth growth of product generated profits. 5
While fixed rates prevailed, corporations focused on their product lines
and let their banks worry about exchange markets. Flexible exchange
rates demanded more extensive hedging strategies which in turn required
hiring new financial experts. The oil companies, IBMs, and ITTs now
maintain full trading desks comparable to those in major banks. Once
financial experts flocked to corporations, they began to turn the treasury
departments into profit centers. Large industrial enterprises began bypas-
sing the commercial banks when they needed to buy or place funds. This
boosted the commercial paper market, saved money for the corporations,
hurt bank profits, and forced banks to seek new profit opportunities of
their own. Most corporations also established Bermuda-based captive in-
surance companies, many of which started writing insurance for other
companies.56 Searching for new fee and service income Continental Grain
and .W.R. Grace set up their own internal consulting firms to advise on
exchange rate prospects. On a larger scale, IBM became the largest pri-
vate publisher in the world (if not the most profitable). For years, Sears
Roebuck and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation have competed
directly with banks, issuing credit and loans to customers.
A second push towards service and fee business was caused by the
growing fear of political risks. Most analysts agree that extractive, re-
source, and mature manufacturing companies are more vulnerable to for-
eign political pressures for nationalization or contract renegotiation than
are service industries or companies with sophisticated technologies and
64 Economists become extremely agitated when non-economists write of "over-competi-
tion." But Minsky's work on financial fragility and C. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (1978) strongly suggests that such a state is not
only possible, but fairly common. In short, financial markets are not self-equilibrating and
are never likely to be.
5 See S.M. ROBBINS & R. STOBAUGH, MONEY IN THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 161
(1973).
66 It is reported that an executive of one major U.S. steel firm, when asked why his
company was putting so much capital into its insurance captive, responded, "We think it is
a better use of our funds than putting them into steel."
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high research and development components. IBM feels more secure than
United Brands. As a result vulnerable corporations have sought ways to
split their risks or to manage them." Joint ventures, management con-
tracts, consulting and licensing agreements, front end fees, and numerous
other strategies contributed to safe, proliferating fee income. The ulti-
mate example of this kind of transformation may be ARAMCO, a firm
which no longer owns any oil. Nonetheless, they continue to make record
profits in management fees, transportation costs, and marketing advice
needed by Saudi Arabia.
These developments suggest that the management of the interna-
tional monetary and economic realm is growing more complex and more
important. The prospects for smooth transition to a new, workable mone-
tary system, for instance, is less likely than a rough transition following
severe crisis or even worldwide collapse. However, the pressure of compe-
tition within the private sector is still growing, no plateau is in sight.
Pressed by competition from previously non-financial firms, banks and
insurance enterprises have sought new profit sources, here and abroad.
Banks now compete directly with Savings and Loans and with insurance
companies. Insurance companies are moving into the banks' traditional
markets. The Glass-Steagall Act is more legal fiction than fact in the
United States and internationally. At home, national banking is almost
reality. Abroad, commercial banks are competing as investment banks.
Everybody is encroaching on other industries' markets, creating huge ser-
vice conglomerates that are difficult to regulate and unlikely to improve
the efficiency of market competition.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, banks, insurance enterprises, and other service sector
companies can directly affect the operations of the international economic
system and its various subsystems. The instability in the monetary sys-
tem, in particular, has allowed for a growth of bank, and perhaps, insur-
ance influence on the structure and functioning of that system. However,
regulators still focus on the need to control corporations operating from
or within their borders. In pursuing domestic goals, they are likely to dis-
tort the international workings of the system, doing more harm than
good. Unfortunately, the market does not seem to function smoothly at a
global level. Over-competition and eventual crisis and collapse have been
the historic rule. Banking and insurance are presently coming out of a
severe price-cutting debacle with potential long-term destabilizing effects.
17 The most cited example of differences in political risk sharing strategies leading to
vastly different results is the case of Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies in Chile.
See T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN
CHILE (1974).
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Other firms which previously operated within the international system
are becoming a part of the functioning of the system as more and more of
their revenues are service based. Unless private executives and govern-
ment officials start examining the problems of money, trade, and invest-
ment on a geo-economic level, collapse is more likely than an ad hoc
transition.

